The Supreme Court decision in Ivey v Genting Casinos rejected the two stage test for dishonesty set out in R v Ghosh and replaced it with a single, objective test which transcends both criminal and civil law. This article asks whether it was correct to create a single test for dishonesty and in doing so, what role will subjectivity now play in the criminal law's application of what is considered dishonest behaviour. Historically, the civil courts have beset with confusion as to the role of subjectivity in the test for dishonesty in light of Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan. The author will consider whether lessons can be learned from the civil courts and whether similar problems will trouble criminal law, particularly in light of criticism of the Ivey test and a preference, by some, for subjectivity to play a greater role in criminal liability for theft and other dishonesty offences.
Introduction
In criminal law, the issue of dishonesty in certain property offences 1 is considered a fundamental ingredient 2 in finding criminal liability. However, the concept of dishonesty is only partially defined in statute, with section 2 of the Theft Act 1968 providing examples where a person is not acting dishonestly. Namely when he is acting in a belief that he has a right in law 3 , a belief that the other person would consent to his taking of the property 4 or that he is acting under a belief that the owner of the property could not be found by taking reasonable steps 5 . The statute fails to define the concept of dishonesty, leaving it to the criminal courts to provide their own definition. Elliott suggests that the word 'dishonestly' 1 For example theft under s.1 of the Theft Act 1968 and Fraud set out under s.1 Fraud Act 2006 2 As Per Edmund Davies LJ in R v Royle [1971] 1 WLR 1764 at 1770 3 S.2(1)(a) Theft Act 1968 4 S.2(1)(b) Theft Act 1968 5 S.2(1)(c) Theft Act 1968 Griew 24 points out that the objective limb in Ghosh deviates from that in Feely with Lord Lane replacing the term 'ordinary decent people' in favour of 'honest people'. 25 Although this may be a matter of mere linguistics, it was not necessarily helpful in maintaining clarity in this regard. Regardless, he question's Lord Lane's interpretation of the Feely test on the basis that his lordship seems to do away with a holistic view of the conduct of the accused with Griew arguing that his should be done 'in the context of the state of mind in which he did it.' 26 The implication is that the Ghosh direction considers the dishonesty of the actions alone, independent of the defendant's frame of mind at the time. As Griew puts it:
The question is not… whether the employee who takes money from a till… is dishonest in doing so and therefore guilty of theft; the question is rather he is guilty of theft, because dishonest, when he "takes money from the till intending to put it back and genuinely believing… that he will be able to do so". 27 The Law Commission suggest that '[c]entral to Feely and Ghosh is the insistence that "dishonesty" is an ordinary word… But even [so] … there is no guarantee that all speakers of the language will agree as to its application, particularly in marginal cases.' 28 A move to purely objective approach to dishonesty risks a defendant gambling on a trial rather than entering a guilty plea in the chance that those 'ordinary and decent people' may apply different standards than he himself possessed. Thus Griew suggests that this may result in more drawn out trials when prior to Feely 'the defendants might have felt constrained to plead guilty.' 29 This is supported by a notion that it is naïve to suppose that there is a single, uniform standard of ordinary decent people within society. 30 we have no reason to suppose that they will be any more honest and "decent" in their standards than the average person.' 32 A simple subjective test, on the other hand, is problematic when dealing with circumstances such as those in R v Gilks 33 where the accused believed that when dealing with a bookmaker he was entitled to keep any winnings paid to him in error and that there was nothing dishonest in doing so. Although Williams suggests that the objection to the approach is 'the judges' supposition that the defendant was entitled as a matter of law to set his own standards' 34 , 'subjectivism of this degree gives subjectivism a bad name.' 35 He reasons that the 'subjective approach to criminal liability, properly understood, looks to the defendant's intention and to the facts as he believed them to be, not to his system of values.' 36 Professor Smith agrees, adding that the rule tends to abandon all standards other than that of the accused himself, in the determination of his responsibility. 37 The introduction of the hybrid, two stage test of Ghosh seemed a compromise on behalf of Lord Lane CJ to mitigate cases such as Gilks. By including reference to the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people in the first limb of the Ghosh test, his lordship was confident that:
Robin Hood or those ardent anti-vivisectionists who remove animals from vivisection laboratories are acting dishonest, even though they may consider themselves to be morally justified in doing what they do, because they know that the ordinary people would consider these actions to be dishonest. 38 His Lordship considered the example from Boggeln v Williams 39 , where D believed that he would be continued to be billed after reconnecting his previously cut-off power supply and therefore refuted any dishonesty on his part. His lordship conceded that this would be a 32 borderline case in which the jury would be entitled to consider if the defendant in that case was merely disobedient or impudent rather than dishonest. 40 The outcome in Ghosh removes the strident nature of the objective test whilst also preventing a thief's charter provided by a purely subjective test but in doing so, created confusion in the form of the second limb of the test. 41 Halpin highlights that the appeal of the Ghosh test is that it appears to strike an effective compromise but '[u]pon further examination… we find within it not a stable compromise but a continuing tension between the subjective and objective approaches…' 42 Mellisaris labels the test as being 'vague and indeterminate'. 43 Campbell warns that 'no one should be seduced into thinking that it is a test of pure social fact… it is a partially idealised test with a necessary component of moral evaluation which will vary from jury to jury.' 44 Glover, in agreeing with earlier criticisms by Griew 45 , suggests that as a 'consequence of the nebulous nature of the Ghosh test, and reliance on the assumption of jurors' innate knowledge of dishonesty, the law appears uncertain and unpredictable' 46 and therefore contravenes the rule of law. 47 It is suggested that the test's second limb is not necessary as juries should take into account the defendant's circumstances whilst applying the first limb anyway as a standard of dishonesty is not considered in vacuo. 48 Spencer takes exception to the retention of a subjective limb of the test suggesting that this allows a defendant to advance a defence of mistake of law by arguing that he believed society would have tolerated his behaviour 49 , concluding that for 'the courts to take their criminal law from the Clapham omnibus is one thing; to take it from the man accused of stealing is quite another.' 50 Williams notes that 'Lord Lane may have considered his judgement as a rescue operation, but if so, it is a rescue that still leaves this heroine in considerable peril.' 51 Wasik, supported a two stage approach suggesting that if a jury were to consider the standards of ordinary people, it would not be contradictory in requiring them to take into account whether the accused believed his conduct was honest or not. 52 In its report on Fraud 53 , The Law
Commission concluded that '[m]any years after its adaption, the Ghosh test remains, in practice, unproblematic.' 54 Indeed, Spencer had argued at the time that 'sooner or later, the question of dishonesty is bound to make its appearance in the House of Lords' 55 , where the slate could be wiped clean and a new definition for dishonesty be provided. 56 Yet, the Ghosh test remained the accepted test for the next thirty-five years until the Ivey decision swept it aside.
Dishonesty in civil law -dishonest assistance
In Barnes v Addy 57 Lord Selborne recognised that strangers to a trust can be personally liable to account as a constructive trustee to beneficiaries of a trust for any loss caused if they assist a breach of trust 'with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the Although the court concluded that dishonesty was not a necessary ingredient for cheating, Lord Hughes took the opportunity to flesh out the legal concept of dishonesty in English law.
His Lordship was highly critical of the criminal law test for dishonesty set out in Ghosh stating that it benefited defendants with warped standards of honesty; too much reliance is unnecessarily placed on the defendant's state of mind; it provides a confusing test for jurors to understand; it has resulted in a divergence between dishonesty in civil and criminal law and that the court in Ghosh were not required to make such a ruling. 90 This adds to academic criticism of the test where it is argued that the second limb of the Ghosh test complicates criminal trials and can result in inconsistency due to additional grounds that can be contested. 91 This is particularly problematic if faced with jurors, required to apply their own standards of honesty, whose standards may not live up to those of 'ordinary decent people' creating the danger of asking jurors to apply higher standards than they themselves attain, 83 Ibid. at para 23 84 In essence, what Lord Hughes set out was an objective test for dishonesty but where before applying this test, the ordinary and decent person is credited with the defendant's knowledge or genuine belief of the facts at hand. By removing the second limb of the Ghosh test, the approach in Ivey no longer considers whether the defendant subjectively realised that he was dishonest. Horder explains the new approach using the example of the taking of a hotel table lamp. One person takes the lamp believing that hotels have to put up with such a loss, the other takes the lamp because they misconceive a nearby sign stating that 'all lighting is free'. 100 Horder argues that whereas the former may have had a claim to acquittal under Ghosh, on the basis that he would not realise that ordinary decent people would find this conduct dishonest, but his defence would fail under the new Ivey test. In contrast, the latter's defence would likely succeed on the basis that her mistaken and rather naïve understanding of the sign would be taken into account. 101
Although Ivey was dealing with a civil appeal, Dyson and Jarvis argue that 'the real reason the case of Ivey found its way to the UKSC was nothing to do with cheating at cards and everything to do with a desire to dispense with part of the Ghosh test for dishonesty.' 102 Ivey now represents the civil law position in terms of dishonesty. Although, in technical terms, Ghosh still remains the leading criminal law precedent, it seems logical, following the same justifications which allowed the Privy Council decisions in Tan and Barlow Clowes to overrule the Court of Appeal in Twinsectra, that Ivey will be adopted in future by the criminal courts too. As Laird puts it: 'It is trite law that the only part of a judgment that is binding is the ratio.
However, the tone of the Supreme Court's judgment strongly suggests that it intends for its obiter analysis of Ghosh to be treated as binding by lower courts.' 103

Indeed, in DPP v Pattison 104 Sir Brian Leveson recognised the statements by Lord Hughes in
Ivey to be strictly obiter and thus despite the High Court being bound by Ghosh, he advocated
that '[g]iven the terms of the unanimous observations of the Supreme Court expressed by Lord
Hughes, who does not shy from asserting that Ghosh does not correctly represent the law, it is difficult to imagine the Court of Appeal preferring Ghosh to Ivey in the future.' 105 In R v Pabon 106 , Lord Justice Gross stated that in light of Ivey v Genting Casinos 'that second leg of R v Ghosh test has been disapproved as not correctly representing the law…' 107 and that it is apparent that the jury, who had been given the Ghosh direction at trial, were 'directed on a basis more favourable to the Appellant than if he were tried today.' 108
Conclusion
Having changed the test for dishonesty, Clough suggests that this deals with the common criticism of Ghosh in that the second limb could create some absurd jury decisions. 109 The new Ivey approach leaving 'less room for manoeuvre'. 110 Likewise, Galli suggests that the 'judgement is likely to be welcome for practitioners and jurors alike, but not those looking to rely on the distorted test for determination of dishonesty in order to circumvent the purpose of the law' 111 , arguing that the Ghosh test allowed the defendant's belief 'to undermine an objective standard' 112 and the change removes that 'vulnerability' 113 by eliminating the subjective limb of the test. Virgo 114 contests this, suggesting that 'there is no evidence from the cases that juries found the Ghosh direction difficult to apply'. 115 The mode of the change of law in Ivey also attracts widespread criticism. Laird expresses surprise that not only Ghosh was rejected but more so in that this took place in a civil case. 116 He points out that Ghosh was not even considered during the appellate history of the Ivey case and as such, 'Ghosh and its effect upon the criminal law was not subject to detailed scrutiny at any stage of the proceedings in Ivey' 117 adding that this 'perhaps explains some of the problematic omissions evident in the Supreme Court's judgement.' 118 First is the presumption by Lord Hughes, in his judgement, that an 'unprincipled divergence' 119 between the civil and criminal tests was problematic. Dyson and Jarvis brazenly suggest that the 'implication that there could be a principled divergence between civil and criminal concepts is welcome.' 120 They add that 'it is not clear that the function of dishonesty in the criminal law is the same as the function of it in the civil law…' 121 and that the civil judiciary can deal with complexity whereas a lay juries require simplicity. 122 Spencer 123 makes similar arguments stating that: 'As unsuccessful defendants in criminal proceedings face consequences far worse than do unsuccessful parties to a civil action, a more generous interpretation of the dishonesty requirement in their favour can hardly be describes as "an unprincipled divergence". 124 Virgo adds that:
Different tests of dishonesty could be justified because civil law dishonesty determines unacceptable conduct in order to impose liability, whereas dishonesty in the criminal law is
concerned with identifying culpability, which requires consideration of the defendant's mental state. The effect of Ivey is to treat dishonesty in the criminal law as a mechanism for assessing conduct rather than culpability, albeit that the defendant's knowledge or belief about the facts is relevant to this objective assessment. 125 Horder emphasises the importance of dishonesty in criminal law on the basis that it 'its sphere of operation is enormous: around one-half of all indictable charges tried by the courts include a requirement of dishonesty.' 126 As such, most of these cases are decided under the judicial test and he suggests that 'even under the simplified Ivey test, that test is open to serious objections' 127 , particularly on the basis that the unfounded view by the courts that dishonesty is easily recognised 128 , it derogates from the rule of law due to ex post facto assessments of ones conduct 129 and leaves room for 'the infiltration of irrelevant factors' in the court room. 130 This change in direction must also be considered in light of cases such as R v Hinks 131 which considered the actus reus of theft and whether the appellant had appropriated £60,000 and a television set when she encouraged her 53-year-old male friend, Mr Dolphin, who was described as naive, gullible and of limited intelligence 132 ; to donate the gifts to her. Rose LJ confirmed that there was a distinction between the two separate ingredients of appropriation and dishonesty and that 'appropriation can occur even though the owner has consented to the property being taken.' 133 The result of this was that the entire issue of whether Ms. Hinks had committed theft therefore rested on whether the jury could be satisfied that she had acted dishonestly when she persuaded Mr Dolphin to give her the gifts. As suggested by Beatson and Simester 134 in order for this to have been a civil wrong the transaction must have been induced by a misrepresentation, duress or undue influence. 135 But despite the absence of any of these inducements, as Beatson and Simester put it, '[i]t appears… that such despicable conduct, though with no civil consequences, may constitute a crime.' 136 In essence, the offence of theft hangs on the dishonesty element, and, as a direct consequence of Hinks and Ivey, there is no longer a need to the defendant to either take another's property adversely nor are they required to realise what they are doing is dishonest. Spencer, who had previously been critical of the Ghosh test of dishonesty admits that '…36 years later, and on the other side of Gomez and Hinks, I confess that I have changed my mind' 137 adding that '…the innocence of anyone who genuinely believes his conduct to be proper by the ordinary standards of honest and reasonable people can be seen as an important limit; and rejecting it extends the offence of theft yet further.' 138 It is hard not to agree with Virgo's concerns when he suggests that theft is now:
[A] crime which requires neither proof of harm nor subjective fault. Together with Hinks, Ivey has resulted in an unacceptable expansion of the criminal jurisdiction, one which is inconsistent with the civil jurisdiction and so constitutes an unprincipled divergence between criminal and civil law. 139 Another concern is what the Ivey test does with Parliamentary supremacy in relation to the Fraud Act 2006. During the passing of the Fraud Bill, Parliament would have had a perfect opportunity to depart from the Ghosh test but chose instead to remain silent on the issue.
Laird suggests that 'had Parliament intended for a specific test of dishonesty to apply, it could have made this explicit.' 140 to the change brought about by Ivey is of particular interest. Here a market trader was convicted of conspiracy to defraud when he manipulated the LIBOR rates to his advantage. It was considered whether, when applying the objective limb of the Ghosh test, the jury could consider the general ethos of the banking system and evidence of market practice. In rejecting this, the Court of Appeal suggested that this would 'gravely affect the proper conduct of business'. 144 They did, however, concede that this evidence would be 'plainly relevant to the second subjective limb.' 145 However, in Hussein v FCA 146 , the Ivey test was applied when considering whether a trader had acted dishonestly when he influenced his employers LIBOR submissions to their advantage. The case was based around communication made by H to the bank's LIBOR submitter and by providing information on his individual trading position this had improperly influenced the submissions. H argued that the conversations were merely about internal hedging opportunities to protect his clients from interest rate fluctuations. He argued that he did not believe the conduct to be improper and believed it to be good practice at the bank during this period. Judge Herrington, accepted that:
as a consequence of the test now formulated in Ivey…. the subjective element must be on what
Mr Hussain knew about the definition of LIBOR…. in other words what did Mr Hussein genuinely believe were the factors that could be taken into account in determining the objective LIBOR rate… In that context it must also be taken into account what Mr Hussein believed as regards to how the information he provided… would be taken into account in determining UBS's LIBOR submissions. 147 The implication here is that the formulation of the Ivey test, in which the jury are invited to consider the actual state of the individual's knowledge or belief as to the facts, leaves the door open for the courts to widen the scope of the test to introduce more subjective components. Dyson and Jarvis speculate whether 'the removal of the subjective limb shifted such awareness on the defendant's part into the objective test, or does it just hang in the air as a piece of evidence unconnected to the issues in the case would be now?' 148 It seems that on the basis of Hussain that the answer may be in the former. Dyson and Jarvis point to other areas of criminal law where the objective standard can be informed by the defendant's subjective view about the reasonableness of the conduct they perform, such as self-defence under s.76(7)(b) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. 149 Their conclusion is that '[t]here is precedent here for the courts to develop the objective limb left by Ivey by importing into it more subjective components.' 150 This would allow the jury to take into account factors such as '"market practice" á la Hayes; and… the defendant's belief in his or her own honesty by reference to the same standards to be applied to the jury.' 151 It is submitted that decisions such as Hussein mark the first rung on this ladder and that the approach in Ivey is far from 147 Ibid. at para 41 148 M. Dyson and P. Jarvis, 'Poison Ivey or herbal tea leaf?' (2018) LQR, 134, 198at 203 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid. 151 Ibid.
